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Accueil > Tradition hindoue > Utpaladeva : Section I. Knowledge — Chapter 3

THE ĪŚVARAPRATYABHIJÑĀKĀRIKĀ OF UTPALADEVA WITH THE AUTHOR’S VRTTI

Utpaladeva : Section I. Knowledge — Chapter 3

Chapter III

mardi 24 avril 2018, par Cardoso de Castro

honnêteté
honestidade
honesty
honneur
honra
honradez
honor
honour
retitude
retidão

1. Agreed. However, that form of cognition intellection
intelecção
intelección
cognição
cognición
cognition
mentation
which is memory mnemosyne
memória
mémoire
memory
, though arising from the latent impression expérience
aisthesis
experiência
sensação
impressão
impression
impresión
sensación
sensation
sentience
vāsanā
deposited by the former direct perception Wahrnehmung 
Vernehmen
perception
percepção
percepción
, is restricted to itself (ātmanișțham) and does not know connaissance
gnosis
intuition intellectuelle
gnôsis
connaître
conhecer
gnose
knowledge
know
conocer
conocimiento
conhecimento
jñāna
jnāna
jnana
the original perception.

- Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impression deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself exclusively knows only its own form. It cannot be claimed that memory determines the object sujet
objet
sujeito
objeto
subject
object
Subjekt
Objekt
formerly perceived, since it [memory] does not penetrate the former direct perception. — 1 —

2. A cognition is self Selbst
soi-même
Soi
si mesmo
Self
si mismo
A non-personal, all-inclusive awareness.
-revealing (svābhāsaiva) and cannot be the object of another cognition, just as the cognition of taste rasa
saveur
sabor
taste
flavor
parfum
perfume
is not known by that of shape. The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that (tadgatih).

[99] I 3.2 — Every cognitive act action
praxis
agir
atuar
ação
act
acción
prattein
is by nature nature
physis
phusis
phúsis
natura
natureza
naturaleza
only aware of itself (svasamvedanaikarūpā) and does not become the object of another cognition : if the cognition of shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice vice
vices
vício
vícios
défaut
malice
malícia
kakíai
versa, then the one L'Un
hen
hén
Uno
the One
would perceive the object of the other and in this way Weg
chemin
caminho
way
camino
every restriction on the activity of the individual Einzelnhet
singularité
singularidade
singularity
singularidad
individuality
individualidade
individualidad
individuation
individuação
individu
indivíduo
individuum
individual
vereinzelt
isolé
Vereinzeltung
isolement
Vereinzelung
esseulement
singularização
créature
criatura
creature
personne
pessoa
person
senses would cease to exist. Since memory arises from the latent impression left gauche
esquerda
izquierda
left
by the former perception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter ; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of this former perception (tadabhāvāt) not even the similarity to it can be maintained. — 2 —

3. [Some might object that] memory appears erroneously (bhrāntyā) as having as its object something directly perceived (dŗșțālambanatā), being Seiende
Seiendes
Seienden
l'étant
étants
ente
entes
sendo
beings
being
reduced, instead, to the only determinative activity directed at them (tadavasāyatah), despite the fact that they have never directly entered its cognitive sphere (atadvișayatve ’pi). But this objection, too, is inconsistent.

- And it cannot even be claimed that memory has these as its object only erroneously, in the sense that it makes the object of its own determinative activity (adhyavasyati) the former direct perception and its object, which in reality Bestand
Grundbestand
Realität 
réalité
realité fondamentale
réalité subsistante
real
réel
realidad
realidade
reality
are not experienced, as happens when one states that one sees silver when faced with mother mère
mãe
mother
madre
-of-pearl. — 3 —

4. How is it possible to reduce the true nature of memory to this ? (smrtitaiva katham tāvad). And how is it possible that the establishment [100] of objects (arthasthitih) should come about thanks to error ? And, if such I 3.4 is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent impressions left by the former direct perception ?

- Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyamātrāt), the object of the former perception being absent (tadvișayasampramoșe) because it [the former perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your conception begreifen 
concevoir
conceber
Begriff
conceito
concept
conception
concepção
concepción
]. Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly perceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if it is a question Frage
fragen
question
questão
questionner
questionar
pergunta
perguntar
pregunta
preguntar
of ‘error’] why insist so much on the fact that memory — conceived of as error — arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is different from the former direct perception from every point of view, (tadbhinnayogakșemāyāh), not coming into contact with it in any way ? — 4 —

5. If the determinative knowledge (avasāyasya) is error, how can it then, being insentient, establish objects ? If on the contrary, it is [101] I 3.5 conceived of as being sentient, how can it, restricted as it is to itself and to its own ideation (nijollekhanișțhāt), establish objective reality ?

- It is the determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyah) alone that — erroneously — establishes objects, and not its self-awareness awareness
being aware
être-conscient
ser-ciente
estar-consciente
dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi
(svasamvit).

If such is the case, it is insentient and — being insentient — how can it cause causa
cause
aitia
aitía
aition
the establishment of objects ? Thus, even if one were to acknowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way, that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to make manifest objects pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects — itself and its own ideation (ab AB
Aitareya Brāhmana
Aitareya Brahmana
Rigveda Brahmanas : The Aitareya and Kausitaki Brāhmanas of the Rigveda, cd. A. B. Keith, Cambridge, Mass., 1920 (HOS XXV).
āhyasvātmollekhamātraprakāśah) — and, therefore, it could not equally be accepted as the cause of that establishment of objects we are dealing with. — 5 —

6. Thus, the functioning of the human world — which stems precisely from the unification unicité
unicidade
unicity
unicidad
wahdat
philia
amizade
favor
propiciação
favorecimento
unification
unificação
unificación
(anusamdhāna) of cognitions, in themselves separate from one another and incapable of knowing one another —would be destroyed...

[102] - Cognitions are restricted to themselves only (svātmamātraparinișțhitāni) I 3.6 and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasamvedyāni) being by nature [exclusively] conscious of themselves. But then how would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavahārah) — culminating in the teaching of the absolute Absolu
Absoluto
Absolute
Absoluteness
Bhairava
Paramaśiva
reality — be possible, since this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of knowledge ? (anyonyavișayasamghațțanāmayah). — 6 —

7... if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all the infinite Unendlichkeit
unendlich
Infinito
Infini
Infinite
Infinité
forms, who is one, whose essence essence
ousía
ousia
essência
essentia
esencia
essence
is consciousness Gewissen
conscience
consciência
conciencia
consciencia
Bewusstsein
Bewußtsein
consciencidade
consciousness
conscient
purusârtha
samvid
bodha
cit
chit
, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion.

- The mutual unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by] the consciousness principle Principe
arche
arkhê
princípio
Princípio
Principio
Principle
(cittattvam) whose form is all, since nothing Nichts
néant
nada
nothing
VOIRE vide
distinct from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge etc. only pertain to this consciousness principle. It has been said : « From me derive memory, knowledge, exclusions — 7 —


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